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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
JOHN LEE HOGUE, : CaseNo. 20041052-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. i 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant entered guilty 
pleas to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) & (b)(i) (West 2004), and driving under 
the influence, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004), 
conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The 
case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court, which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Following a valid stop, was defendant's continued detention lawful and the ensuing 
search justified? 
The denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95, K 15,103 P.3d 699. Nevertheless, the trial court's underlying factual findings 
must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. See id. No deference is accorded the trial court's 
application of law to those facts. See id. 
2. Did defense counsel's failure to object to the deputy's qualifications to testify 
render counsel ineffective or result in plain error? 
Defendant did not challenge the deputy's qualifications pursuant to rule 702, Utah 
Rules of Evidence and a foundation objection was not reserved in the conditional plea 
agreement. Therefore, the issue may not be considered for the first time on appeal. See State 
v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 223 n.l (Utah App. 1995); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 
(Utah App. 1990). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Defendant's conditional plea agreement reserved only the right to raise a Fourth 
Amendment challenge on appeal (R. 121-22). The federal amendment and any other 
provisions cited in argument are attached in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 20, 2002, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony enhanced to 
a first degree felony based on defendant's prior conviction and pursuant to section 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii) & (b)(i); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004); and driving under the influence, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-44 (R. 1-2). 
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Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the drugs found in his possession (R. 34-
42). Defendant conceded that the initial stop was valid, but alleged that the legitimate 
purpose of the stop was impermissibly expanded when he was detained and searched without 
justification (id.). An evidentiary hearing was conducted (R. 45-46; R176: 1-48). At its 
conclusion, the trial court orally denied the motion, but did not enter a written order (R176: 
64-66). See Addendum B (Argument & Oral Ruling Denying Motion to Suppress). 
On August 25, 2003, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts: first 
degree felony possession with intent to distribute and class B misdemeanor driving under the 
influence (R. 114-15, 116-27). Pursuant to the plea bargain, the paraphernalia charge was 
dismissed and defendant was permitted to reserve the right to appeal the "issues that were 
raised at the Suppression Hearing in this matter" (R. 121 -22). Sentencing was scheduled, but 
defendant failed to appear (R. 136, 144). Approximately a year later, he was arrested and, 
on November 23,2004, sentenced to five-years-to-life imprisonment on the felony conviction 
and to concurrent six-months imprisonment on the misdemeanor conviction (R. 151-52). 
Formal judgment was entered December 6, 2004 (R. 144, 155-57). On December 3, 2004, 
defendant timely appealed (R. 153-54). See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2). The case was then 
"poured over" from the supreme court to this Court (R. 182). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On the morning of September 13, 2002, Deputy Leonard Isaacson of the Uintah 
County Sheriffs Office was dispatched to investigate a vehicle burglary that had just 
occurred (Rl 76: 5). The victim told the police that he saw David Sentie near the burglarized 
vehicle (id.). An eyewitness saw Sentie walk away from the scene and towards defendant's 
residence, where Sentie got into defendant's truck and was driven away (id.).2 Deputy 
Isaacson obtained a description of the truck and the address for defendant's welding business 
because the deputy had information that defendant and/or Sentie might be there (Rl 76: 5,7). 
The deputy also learned that Sentie had two outstanding arrest warrants and that defendant 
hadnone(R176:5, 9). 
The deputy left the vehicle burglary site shortly before 11 a.m. and drove towards 
defendant's business (R176: 5, 7,24). He saw defendant's truck stopped at an intersection, 
waiting to turn (R176: 5). The deputy did not activate his siren or his overhead lights, but 
instead drove up behind defendant's truck on the public street (R176: 5, 38). 
Defendant quickly realized that a police vehicle was behind him (R176: 6, 39). He 
stopped watching the on-coming traffic and began "intently watching" the deputy by staring 
into the truck's rearview and side mirrors (id). 
!The facts are taken from the suppression hearing and are stated in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. See State v. Yoder, 935 
P.2d 534, 537 n.l (Utah App. 1997). 
2On this record, it is unclear if the victim or a second eyewitness observed Sentie 
in defendant's truck (R176: 5, 17). In any case, defendant admitted that Sentie was in his 
truck (R176: 12, 17, 24, 35, 44). 
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The deputy pointed a finger towards a parking lot immediately to the right of the 
intersection, which was defendant's business parking lot (id.). Defendant acknowledged the 
signal by nodding into his rearview mirror and then pulled back into his lot (R176: 6-7, 39). 
The deputy followed. As the deputy passed in front of the truck, he only saw defendant in 
it(R176:5,7, 12, 17, 24, 33, 44).3 
The deputy walked up to the driver's window and observed signs of intoxication. 
Defendant was unusually nervous: 
As I approached his movements were quick, sharp, jerky. When he turned and 
looked at me and was looking around, his eyes - most people don't - when 
they're not nervous don't have wide open eyes looking around, a state of [sic] 
a person uses in order to gather more information into their eyes when we're 
nervous, excited or in fear of something in order to gather more information. 
His eyes were wide open. There was no doubt he was in an excited state. 
(R176: 9). The deputy described the nervousness as more than that normally exhibited "by 
someone who was nervous just because the cops were there" (R176: 26, 30-32). 
The deputy also observed that defendant's pupils were dilated (Rl 76:10). The deputy 
found this "very uncommon" at 11 a.m. (id.). In his experience, dilated pupils were 
indicative of drug usage, especially if dilated in the morning (id.). 
Additionally, the deputy observed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot (R176: 11-
12). The deputy knew that defendant was a welder, an occupation the deputy had been 
associated with for years before joining the police (R176: 6, 34, 37). He knew that welding 
3Below and on appeal, defendant classifies the stop as a consensual level-one 
encounter and does not challenge its validity if limited to questions about Sentie (R. 39-
40; R176: 57). See also Brief of Appellant at 5, 8, 13. 
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could result in bloodshot eyes, but also knew that welding could not account for defendant's 
dilated pupils and jerky nervousness (R176:28). Drug or alcohol ingestion, however, could 
account the dilation and nervousness (R176: 12). The deputy suspected drugs, and not 
alcohol, because no odor of alcohol emitted from defendant or the truck (id.). 
Deputy Isaacson asked defendant to turn off the motor and step out of the truck 
(R176: 12, 24-25). When defendant did, the deputy asked him to confirm his identity and 
then questioned him about Sentie (Rl76:12,17,35,44). Defendant admitted that Sentie had 
been in his truck earlier, but claimed to have dropped him off at a different location (id.). 
As they spoke, the deputy observed additional signs of impairment. Defendant's 
answers "were very quick to come out. They were complete sentences, but they were very 
fast and short, right to the point, and his nervousness seemed to maintain the same level" 
(id.). The deputy testified that this further supported his suspicion that defendant was under 
the influence of drugs, specifically stimulants: 
People who are nervous are quick to shoot out a short answer. Also, people 
whose internal clocks are sped up are quick to blurt out what the first thing that 
comes to their mind without forethought of how to deliver the information 
they're trying to give. 
(R176: 12-13). The deputy saw another sign of drug use: 
As Mr. Hogue got out of the vehicle and started talking with me, it was almost 
like the color was draining from his face. In fact, that's the commentary I used 
in my report in order to verify that. It's really hard to explain other than that. 
Usually when a heart - the blood pressure and that goes up, the body shuts 
down the extremities or the portions of the fingers and the body. It's not 
proportionate to the four [sic], five [sic], flight, food, or fornication, which is 
common information received not only in the DRE [Drug Recognition Expert 
Training], but other things that says when the blood pressure goes up things -
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the extremities will get cold. That's why a lot of people start pumping 
themselves up . . . . In this case Mr. Hogue lost the color in his face and started 
exhibiting body tremors. It came from the mid-section in the legs. There was 
none in the arms. 
(R176: 13). Defendant's quick responses coupled with his facial color change were 
symptoms of an elevated heart rate, which the deputy suspected was the result of either 
extreme nervousness and/or drug-impairment (R176: 14).4 
The deputy continued to describe the signs of impairment he observed: "There's a 
tremor that comes from the mid-section, just a shakiness. To look at it, you'd think maybe 
the individual was shaking because of coldness" (R176: 14). But that morning, it was not 
that cold (id.). Consequently, the deputy found defendant's shaking unusual and suggestive 
of impairment (Rl 76: 12-14). 
The deputy decided that he would confirm or dispel his suspicions by administering 
field sobriety tests (R176: 21, 45-46). The deputy first had another concern: 
While I was talking with Mr. Hogue, he was standing away from me three to 
five feet. I was within interview distance from him to listen to him and watch 
him. But he was standing with one arm stiff and one arm limp to his side. The 
funny thing about it was the way that - usually a person when they're 
explaining themselves or whether they're just standing there, usually both sides 
of the body would exhibit the same commentary, physical statement basically 
to say. His right side was stiff and his hand was squared over his pocket about 
4At the suppression hearing (April 2003), Deputy Isaacson testified that he was a 
certified drug recognition expert [DRE], but explained that at the time of the stop 
(September 2002), he was not certified (R176: 10-11). He explained that at the time of 
the stop, he had completed and passed all the required class training for DRE certification 
and was in the process of completing twelve required supervised field evaluations (id.). 
Either at the beginning or end of that month, Deputy Isaacson learned he had passed the 
field portion (id.). He then submitted his paper work and was formally certified sometime 
after the stop (id.). 
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an inch away from it to the side, and his other arm was just loosely to this side. 
But this arm was stiff and this arm was loose. This hand was just cupped in 
a normal - to the side, but this hand was spread wide open and covering the 
right pocket. 
(R176: 16). The deputy explained that defendant's "non-verbal statement" of holding his 
right hand stiffly over his right pocket indicated that defendant was "trying to hide or 
obscure" whatever was in his pocket (R176: 16-17). Moreover, the deputy could see that 
something was obviously in the pocket because it bulged out about 1/4 to 2 inches (R176: 
27). These observations coupled with defendant's nervousness lead the deputy to suspect 
that he was concealing either a weapon or drugs in his pocket (R176: 26-27, 30-32).5 
Only three to four minutes had elapsed since the initial stop (Rl 76: 17). During that 
time, the deputy's initial suspicion of drug impairment—based on defendant's jerky 
movements, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes—had become elevated, not diminished, by 
defendant's other physical characteristics and his verbal responses (R176: 17, 21, 26, 31). 
Only at this point, did the deputy ask about the bulges in defendant's pockets (R176: 
17). The deputy asked defendant if he had a weapon or "something [the deputy] needed to 
be concerned about" in his pockets (R176: 17). Defendant stated twice that there was 
nothing in his pockets (R176: 18-19, 35). The deputy knew defendant's denials were false 
5Both of defendant's front pants pockets bulged, but the deputy's primary concern 
was with the right pocket because it was the one being concealed and was so full that no 
item(s) could be distinguished (R176: 16-18). At the suppression hearing, defendant 
admitted that his pockets bulged, but claimed they were hidden from view by his shirt 
(R176: 37-38). The deputy testified that whatever clothing defendant had on, it did not 
prevent him from plainly seeing the bulging pockets (R176: 47). 
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because the bulging pockets were obvious (R176: 18-19). Moreover, defendant was 
becoming abnormally nervous: 
If I pull somebody over and they appear a little bit nervous, but their eyes 
aren't dilated, they're not bloodshot. I ask them for information and they're 
reaching to find it and they're fumbling around and they start explaining to me 
they don't know, they haven't been stopped for so long. They go on with their 
commentary saying, "I'm not sure where it's at. I do have insurance," and they 
end up not finding that information like [defense counsel] was pointing out. 
That is in its entirety someone who's just nervous because the cops were there, 
meaning no reason other than they hadn't been stopped in awhile by their own 
admission. Hadn't been stopped in awhile, here's - I'm having a tough time 
finding what I'm looking for. 
That's what [defense counsel] was not understanding was this - in this 
case the nervousness and physical language that was coming from Mr. Hogue 
was that of someone who is being deceitful, nervous because of one of several 
reasons, the indicia of the dilated pupils and the other indicators of the body 
that I was seeing was that of someone who had been using and did have 
something to hide, especially by the right hand in its position over the pocket 
about an inch away, and the left hand limply to the side. 
The totality of the circumstances of each stop is based on the 
information I receive verbally, physically, and in Mr. Hogue's case, it was not 
someone who was fumbling around for his driver's licence in his wallet or 
something to that effect. 
(R176:31). 
The deputy asked defendant if he would empty out his pockets so the deputy 
"wouldn't have anything to worry about" (R176: 19). Defendant began emptying out his 
pockets, but then fidgeted with something in his right pocket: 
It appeared that as he was reaching into his pocket he was cupping something 
to the back of his pocket and pushing it down as he kept going into his pocket 
and pulling things out. He went into his pocket two times - two different 
times. One time he pushed whatever he was covertly hiding in that pocket 
towards the bottom is the way it appeared. 
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(R176: 20). The deputy could now see "two distinct little bulges" at the bottom of the right 
pocket (R176: 20). Based on the size of the bulges, the deputy no longer suspected a 
weapon, but still suspected drugs (id.). The deputy asked defendant what he was hiding and 
defendant asked if he was under arrest (R176: 21). The deputy said no, because he had not 
completed his investigation of defendant's impairment and possible driving under the 
influence (R176: 21). 
The deputy warned defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant waived (Rl 76: 
22). They spoke "a little bit" and defendant admitted that he ingested methamphetamine at 
10 o'clock (R176: 22, 39-40).6 The deputy asked defendant to remove the remaining item 
from his pocket, which defendant did (R176: 23, 36, 45). It was a "little leather purse" 
containing methamphetamine (R176: 22-23, 45). 
The deputy had defendant perform four field sobriety tests: an HGN test, the one-
legged stand, the nine-step walk and turn, and the Romburg test (R176: 45-46). The tests 
confirmed Deputy Isaacson's suspicion that defendant had ingested a stimulant and was 
"impaired to the point he was not safe to operate a motor vehicle" (R176: 46-47). 
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and drug possession (R176: 
45). The entire detention, from stop to arrest, lasted fifteen to twenty minutes (R176: 45). 
6Because the stop occurred at 11 a.m., the deputy assumed defendant meant 10 
a.m. Defendant testified that he meant 10 p.m. (R. 41; R176: 39-40). Nevertheless, 
defendant admitted that he "might" still have been under its influence and appeared 
impaired when stopped, though he "doubted" it because he did not think he ingested that 
much methamphetamine (R176: 40). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fourth Amendment Challenge: Defendant does not challenge the validity of the 
initial stop. He claims only that once the purpose of the initial stop was completed—that is, 
once the deputy questioned him about Sentie—no further detention was warranted. He also 
claims that the search of his pocket was illegal. Defendant's arguments are without merit. 
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention. Here, the deputy 
originally stopped defendant to question him about Sentie, but once stopped, the deputy 
immediately and reasonably suspected that defendant was impaired. To confirm or dispel 
these suspicions, the deputy ordered him to exit the truck, observed additional signs of 
impairment, and ultimately administered field sobriety tests to defendant. When defendant 
failed those tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence. Based on the totality of 
the circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that reasonable suspicion supported 
defendant's continued detention and probable cause supported his arrest. 
In investigating defendant's impairment, the deputy observed defendant attempting 
to conceal his bulging right pocket. Defendant twice falsely denied that anything was in the 
pocket. Suspecting that defendant was concealing a weapon or drugs, the deputy instructed 
him to empty it. The trial court correctly found that the deputy's observations coupled with 
defendant's false statements justified the search. 
Alternatively, the search may be upheld on any ground apparent in the record. Here, 
the search took place prior to, but contemporaneous with, defendant's valid arrest for driving 
under the influence. Consequently, it is justifiable as a search incident to arrest. For much 
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the same reason, the discovery of the drugs was also inevitable. The record establishes that 
independent of the search, the deputy intended to administer field sobriety tests. Once those 
tests were given, the predictable outcome was arrest for driving under the influence. And 
once arrested, the search of defendant's person and the discovery of the drugs were 
inevitable. 
Rule 702 Objection: Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to the deputy's suppression hearing testimony. According 
to defendant, the deputy should not have been allowed to describe defendant's drug 
impairment because he did not qualify as an expert under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
He also claims that the trial court plainly erred in permitting the testimony. 
Defendant's claim should be summarily rejected because it is not properly before the 
Court. A defendant cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal from a conditional 
guilty plea. Instead, the only issues which may be raised are those expressly reserved in the 
conditional plea agreement with the consent of the prosecutor and the approval of the trial 
court. Here, the plea agreement reserved only the right to appeal the denial of defendant's 
Fourth Amendment claim. 
Even if the rule 702 issue was legitimately raised on appeal, it has no merit. The rules 
of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings. Moreover, even if the rules did apply, the 
deputy qualified as an expert. Furthermore, specialized knowledge was not required to 
testify to many of the signs of impairment that the deputy observed. Because defendant 
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cannot establish error in the admission of the deputy's testimony, his ineffective assistance 
of counsel and plain error claims necessarily fail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED DETENTION WAS LAWFUL AND HIS 
SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
This appeal is from conditional guilty pleas (R121-22). The issues on appeal are 
limited to those reserved in the plea agreement, that is, to the issues "raised at the 
Suppression Hearing in this matter" (id.). See Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) {Addendum A). See 
also Point II, infra. The issues that were raised in the suppression hearing are: (1) whether 
following the valid initial stop, defendant's continued detention was lawful; and (2) whether 
the ensuing search of defendant's pocket was justified (R. 34-42; R176: 57-64). The trial 
court found both the detention and search permissible and denied defendant's motion to 
suppress (R176: 64-66). See Addendum B (Argument & Oral Ruling). The trial court's 
ruling is correct. 
B elow and on appeal, defendant acknowledges that he voluntarily pulled back into his 
own business lot and characterizes the initial encounter as a level one consensual encounter 
(R. 39-40; R176: 57). See Brief of Appellant [Br.Apll] at 5, 8,13. Such encounters do not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) 
(recognizing that "an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will" and classifying such encounters as level one 
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consensual encounters that require no particularized suspicion); Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 
P.2d 1003, 1005 (Utah App.) (holding that a police request to a suspect to walk outside a 
nightclub and speak to officers was a consensual encounter), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 
(Utah 1996). 
The trial court commented that when the deputy signaled with his finger for defendant 
to pull into the parking lot, a level-two stop may have ensued (R176: 64-65). Defendant, 
however, does not dispute that Deputy Isaacson was legitimately investigating a vehicle 
burglary or that he had reason to believe that defendant drove the suspect, David Sentie, 
away from the scene in defendant's truck. See Br.Aplt. at 5,8,13. He concedes that the facts 
justified a stop to question defendant about his involvement with Sentie and to determine 
Sentie's whereabouts. See id. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 618 (recognizing that police are 
justified in questioning individuals seen in the area of a burglary alarm); United States v. 
Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1166-67, (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing that police are justified in 
questioning individuals who "either observed or [were] involved" in a recent crime), cert, 
denied, 541 U.S. 954 (2004). Therefore, this Court need not determine the level of the initial 
encounter because its validity is not contested. 
Defendant argues that once defendant had been questioned about Sentie, there was no 
legitimate basis to further detain or search him. See Br.Aplt. at 5-15. Defendant's argument 
ignores the facts of this case.7 
7Defendant also argues that even though it was permissible to question him at the 
window of the truck, he should not have been asked to exit the truck for that questioning. 
See Br.Aplt. at 8-9 & 13. Defendant is incorrect. It is well-established that the occupants 
14 
As the trial court correctly concluded, as soon as the deputy lawfully approached 
defendant's truck, he observed that defendant was impaired, which justified defendant's 
continued detention beyond the purpose of the burglary questioning (R176: 64-66). See 
Subsection B, infra. That legitimate period of continued detention to investigate defendant's 
impairment quickly elevated to probable cause for his arrest for driving under the influence 
(id.). The court also correctly concluded that the search (emptying of defendant's pocket) 
was justified based on the deputy's observations of defendant and defendant's false answers 
(R176: 65). See Subsection C, infra. 
Alternatively, the search may be upheld on any ground apparent in the record. See 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996). Here, defendant's arrest for driving under 
the influence was valid. Consequently, the search of defendant's pocket, which proceeded, 
but was contemporaneous with that arrest, constituted a valid search incident to arrest. For 
much the same reason, the discovery of the drugs in defendant's pocket was also inevitable. 
Independent of the search, the deputy intended to administer field sobriety tests. The results 
of those tests destined defendant's arrest, which in turn rendered the discovery of the drugs 
incident to that arrest inevitable. See Subsection C, infra. 
Under any of these theories, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
should be affirmed. This Court need not reach the merits, however, because defendant has 
failed to properly marshal the facts. 
of a lawfully stopped vehicle may be ordered to exit it. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (passenger); Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977) 
(driver). 
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A. Defendant's Failure to Marshal the Facts Precludes Consideration 
of His Claims on Appeal 
"The legal analysis of search and seizure cases is highly fact dependent." State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, t 2, 103 P.2d 699. The trial court's factual findings are accordingly 
entitled to deference on appeal and upheld unless clearly erroneous. Id. at f 15. The trial 
court's application of law to those facts is accorded no deference and reviewed for 
correctness. Id. See also State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^  20-23. 
Give the fact-dependent nature of the inquiry, defendant is obligated to marshal the 
facts in support of the trial court's factual findings and ultimate legal ruling before he may 
attack either. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
2006 UT 35, ffll 24-26, 140 P.3d 1200; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 16, 100 P.3d 1177. 
Marshaling requires a defendant to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced [at the hearing] to support the very findings [he] 
resists." Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). He "must 
correlate all particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and then convince [the 
appellate court] that the trial court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its findings." 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, a defendant must become 
a "devil's advocate" by "temporarily removing] [his] own prejudices and fully embracing] 
the adversary's position." Id. Only in this manner can a defendant establish the "fatal flaw" 
in the trial court's reasoning justifying reversal of its decision. See id. at ^f 78-79. 
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Here, defendant has failed to meet this obligation. Consequently, his claims on appeal 
maybe summarily rejected. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, \ 27; Chen, 2004 
UT 82, If 80.. 
Comparison of defendant's summary of the deputy's testimony with the State's 
summary quickly establishes defendant's marshaling failures. Compare BrAplt. at 4, with 
State's Statement of Facts, supra, at 4-10. In a single paragraph, defendant purports to 
summarize Deputy Isaacson's extensive and detailed testimony. See BrAplt. at 4. The 
summary wholly fails to marshal the facts. For example, defendant states that the deputy 
only "noted that Mr. Hogue appeared nervous," but "did not testify to any lack of balance, 
erratic movements or anything of the sort" to suggest that defendant was impaired. See 
BrAplt. at 4. This does not marshal the deputy's testimony, which abounds with detailed 
observations of defendant's drug impairment. See supra, at 4-10. Similarly, defendant 
claims that he was searched only because he was nervous. SeeBrAplt. at4. Again, this does 
not marshal the facts. The deputy testified that when he directed defendant to empty his 
pockets, he believed that the bulging pocket contained a weapon or drugs based on the size 
of the bulge, defendant's attempts to conceal his right pocket, and his false denials that 
anything was in either pocket. See supra, at 7-8. 
Defendant also improperly states that Deputy Isaacson "testified that he was not 
trained as a Drug Recognition Expert." See BrAplt. at 15. See also BrAplt. at 17-18 
(repeating that the deputy had no training in drug recognition and "had not passed the [DRE] 
course"). This does not marshal the facts. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Isaacson 
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testified that he was a certified drug recognition expert (R176: 10-11). He explained that at 
the time of the stop, he was not certified (id.). He had completed and passed all required 
classroom drug recognition training and was in the process of completing twelve supervised 
field evaluations (id.). Either shortly before or shortly after the stop, he was notified that he 
had passed and, after the stop, was certified (id.). See supra, at 7 n.4. Additionally, as the 
trial court noted, the deputy was otherwise experienced and several of the physical 
characteristics he observed were commonly recognized symptoms of drug use (R176: 65). 
Moreover, to the extent defendant acknowledges facts, he impermissibly parses them 
to minimize their significance. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) 
(directing that in determining reasonable suspicion, the facts must not be viewed in isolation, 
but judged in their totality). Again, this does not met the marshaling standard. See United 
Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, \ 26 (reaffirming that marshaling obligation is not met 
by "merely re-argu[ing[ the factual case presented to the trial court") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). For example, defendant claims that Deputy Isaacson never 
suspected that defendant was armed. See Br.Aplt. at 7 (citing R176: 21). In contrast, when 
marshaled, the facts establish that the deputy was concerned that defendant was concealing 
a weapon in his bulging pocket and only discounted this concern after the pocket was 
emptied of everything but the small purse (R176: 16-17, 20, 26-27, 30-32). Similarly, 
defendant asserts that the deputy's testimony was conflicting and not credible. See Br.Aplt. 
at 15. Defendant alleges that the deputy inconsistently denied knowing defendant and yet 
claimed to have recognized his truck. See id. (citing R176: 5 & 9). If marshaled, the facts 
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establish no inconsistency. The deputy testified that he did not know defendant (R176: 9). 
But in investigating the vehicle burglary, the deputy obtained a description of defendant's 
truck, which enabled him to recognize it when he saw it at the street intersection in front of 
defendant's business (R176: 5,28). Defendant also asserts that the deputy was not credible 
concerning what clothing defendant wore and whether a weapon was ever found. See 
Br.Aplt. at 15 (citing R176: 21, 26, 33). Neither assertion is supported by the marshaled 
facts. The deputy stated only that he did not recall finding a weapon and none was listed in 
his report (R176: 33). The deputy also stated that he did not particularly remember 
defendant's clothing because, contrary to defendant's assertion, no clothing restricted the 
deputy's view of defendant's pockets (R176: 16-19, 27). 
In sum, defendant's failures to marshal the suppression hearing testimony that 
supports the trial court's factual findings and ruling justifies summary affirmance of 
defendant's convictions. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, Tf 27; Chen, 2004 
UT 82, f^ 80. Even if defendant's claims are considered, they are without merit. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Deputy's 
Observations of Defendant Supported His Continued 
Detention. 
Defendant claims that no reasonable suspicion existed to support his further detention 
once he responded to the questions about Sentie.8 See Br.Aplt. at 8-14. The argument 
8Defendant erroneously asserts that his continued detention was a "level two or 
three detention." See Br.Aplt. at 9. Defendant is incorrect. A level three detention only 
occurred when defendant was arrested for driving under the influence after failing the 
field sobriety tests (R176: 46). See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-618 (classifying an arrest 
as a level three seizure requiring probable cause). 
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ignores the facts. When the totality of the facts are considered, they amply support a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was impaired while driving and justify his continued 
detention. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (reaffirming that continued 
investigatory detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 
articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot). See alsoArvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (requiring 
that facts supporting reasonable suspicion must be viewed in their totality and not in 
isolation). 
The facts establish that before defendant was ordered out of his truck and questioned 
about Sentie, Deputy Isaacson observed defendant's dilated pupils, his bloodshot eyes, and 
his jerky overly nervous movements. See supra, at 5-6. Based on his training and 
experience, the deputy suspected that defendant was impaired. See id. Indeed, as the trial 
court correctly noted, the condition of defendant's eyes alone supported a reasonable 
suspicion that he was driving while impaired (Rl 76:65). See State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 
96, \ 13, 89 P.3d 185 (recognizing that a driver's "red, droopy, and watery" eyes and dilated 
pupils support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). See also State v. Santacruz, 133 
P.3d 484, 486 (Wash. App. 2006) (holding that driver's dilated eyes created a "specific, 
articulable reason to inquire further"). 
Once defendant was out of the truck, the deputy discounted alcohol as the source of 
the impairment because there was no smell of alcohol on defendant or emitting from the 
truck (R176: 12). The deputy also reasonably discounted defendant's welding work as the 
source of the combined physical traits he observed (R176: 28). And though the deputy was 
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not required to eliminate these innocent explanations for defendant's physical condition, the 
fact that he considered, but then reasonably discounted them, served only to heighten his 
suspicions. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (holding that a "determination that reasonable 
suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct"); State v. 
Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 17, 112 P.3d 507 (same). 
During his questioning of Sentie, the deputy observed additional signs of impairment. 
See supra, at 6-7. These additional signs (quick accelerated answers, body tremors, and the 
color draining from defendant's face) not only confirmed, but elevated the deputy's initial 
suspicion of impairment. Accordingly, the deputy decided to administer field sobriety tests. 
See supra, at 7. See also Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (recognizing that during a level two 
detention, the officer "must diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
When defendant failed those tests, probable cause existed for his arrest for driving under the 
influence. 
In sum, as the trial court correctly found and concluded, there was ample justification 
to support defendant's continued detention and ultimate arrest (R176: 64-66) {Add. B). Cf. 
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ^ 12-17 (recognizing that reasonable suspicion supported 
Hechtle's continued detention, but concluding that probable cause did not exist to arrest him 
for driving with any measurable controlled substance in his body where there was no 
evidence of recent drug use and officer did not administer field sobriety tests to confirm his 
suspicions). 
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In attacking the trial court's ruling, defendant impermissibly parses the supporting 
facts to minimize their significance. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (requiring facts to be 
judged in their totality). For example, defendant asserts that the deputy detained him only 
because he was nervous and then argues that nervousness alone cannot establish reasonable 
suspicion. See Br.Aplt. at 4-15. However, the deputy did not detain defendant merely 
because he was nervous, but because of numerous physical signs of impairment, only one of 
which was defendant's jerky nervous movements. See supra, at 4-10 (describing in detail 
defendant's nervousness, "wide-open" blood shot eyes, dilated pupils, and body tremors). 
Additionally, defendant's nervousness increased during the encounter, especially when asked 
about the bulge in his pocket (Rl 76:18). The deputy compared defendant's reaction to other 
individuals he stopped and, by comparison, concluded that defendant's increased 
nervousness was abnormal (R176: 26,30-32). SeeArvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-76 (recognizing 
that an officer's assessment of "odd" behavior compared to other encounters may be 
considered in determining reasonable suspicion). And when asked about what was in his 
pockets, defendant gave observable false answers (R176: 18-19, 35). Based on the totality 
of these facts, the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant had ingested drugs and had a 
weapon or drugs in his pocket. See Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 21 (recognizing that unusual 
behavior and answers "inconsistent with observable facts" supported reasonable suspicion 
to continue detention); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing 
that efforts at concealment and false answers supported continued detention). 
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Moreover, though defendant argues that the trial court should not have believed the 
deputy, see Br.Aplt. at 15, defendant never denied the deputy's observations. To the 
contrary, defendant testified that he ingested methamphetamine before being stopped, albeit 
he claimed the night before (R176: 39-40). See supra, at 10 n.6. And while he did not "see 
how [he had] done enough" drugs to still be under their influence in the morning, he admitted 
that it was possible that he was impaired when stopped (R176: 40). Thus, the facts 
evidencing defendant's impairment—and supporting reasonable suspicion—were not 
significantly challenged at the suppression hearing. 
In sum, the trial court properly considered the totality of the facts, properly credited 
the deputy's testimony, and correctly ruled that reasonable suspicion supported defendant's 
continued detention. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Search of Defendant ys 
Pocket Was Permissible. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the search was justified based on the deputy's 
observations and defendant's false answers that nothing was in his pockets (R176: 65-66). 
The court's ruling is admittedly minimal: 
Then, as [defense counsel] said, we get to the search. The search, I guess as 
a result of Deputy Isaacson asking him what was in his pockets, there was 
visibly something in his pocket. He said it extended in a bulge and that he was 
concerned. The defendant answered nothing twice when asked if there was -
what was in his pockets. They gave him Miranda. He was asked to empty his 
pockets, and out came the dope. 
I think his actions are reasonable here . . . I'm going to deny your 
motion to suppress. 
(id.) {Add. B). 
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Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling is two-fold. See Br.Aplt. at 7-8. He 
claims that the search cannot be justified as a Terry frisk. See Br.Aplt. at 7. He also claims 
that probable cause did not support the search. See Br.Aplt. at 8. 
Defendant is correct that the search does not constitute a Terry frisk, which is 
confined to a pat down of a suspect's outer clothing. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 
(1968) (permitting a patting of a suspect's outside clothing when an officer reasonably 
believes the suspect may be armed and dangerous). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 
(West 2004) (permitting a "frisk" of a detainee based on a reasonable suspicion that he is 
armed). Here, no frisk occurred (R176: 45). Instead, defendant was asked to empty his 
pockets (R176: 19). The search is supported by probable cause.9 
Three facts combine to create probable cause to search. First, defendant's physical 
characteristics supported a reasonable suspicion that he had recently ingested drugs. See 
discussion, supra. Second, the size of the bulge in his right pocket and defendant's attempts 
to conceal it suggested that the pocket contained a weapon or drugs (R176: 16, 19). And 
9To be lawful, a warrantless search must be supported by probable cause and an 
exception to the warrant requirement, typically exigent circumstances, must apply. See 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (defining exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search as those circumstances "that could cause a reasonable 
person to believe that [an immediate search] was necessary to prevent physical harm to 
the officer[,] . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect") 
(citation and internal question marks omitted). Here, defendant only attacks the probable 
cause to search and does not claim that exigent circumstances did not exist. See Br.Aplt. 
at 5-15. 
Moreover, as will be discussed, infra, the warrantless search is justified under two 
additional exceptions—the search incident to arrest exception and the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. 
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third, defendant lied when he claimed nothing was in either of his pockets (R176: 18-19). 
See State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, \ 8, 141 P.3d 602 (holding that a suspect's 
"implausible answer/' nervous behavior, and attempt to conceal objects associated with drug 
usage supported probable cause to search the suspect's vehicle) Menke, 787 P.2d at 542-43 
(holding that Menke's obviously false responses to what was in a grocery bag coupled with 
a reasonable suspicion that he had shoplifted "tip the scales" and supported probable cause 
to search the bag). Accord Yoder, 935 P.2d at 541-42 (holding that Yoder's false answers 
coupled with his "nervous and suspicious behavior" when questioned by the police 
established probable cause to search his apartment); State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1187-
88 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that false answers coupled with nervous behavior and 
reasonable suspicion of theft justified search of automobile). See also State v. Velenzuela, 
589 P.2d 1306,1306-1307 (Ariz. 1979) (holding that probable cause to reach into suspect's 
bulging pocket existed based on a reasonable suspicion of recent drug use coupled with 
suspect's denial that anything was in his bulging pocket). 
Alternatively, the search may be upheld on any ground apparent in the record. See 
South, 924 P.2d at 356. Here, the search may easily be upheld as either a search incident to 
defendant's valid arrest for driving under the influence or pursuant to the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. 
Normally, a search incident to arrest follows the arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752,762-63 (recognizing that when an arrest is made, "it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might 
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seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . [and] to search for and seize any 
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction"). But 
a search which precedes an arrest may also be justified as "incident to arrest" if the two occur 
contemporaneously and probable cause supports the arrest independent of the search. See 
State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, f 11, 69 P.3d 293. Here, these conditions are met. 
The deputy observed all the physical signs of impairment before the search occurred. 
See supra, at 4-8. He then initiated the search of defendant's pockets before administering 
the field sobriety tests to reassure himself that defendant had nothing in them to be 
"concerned about" (R176: 17,21,45-46). After finding the drugs, the deputy completed the 
investigation into defendant's impairment by administering the field tests and, when 
defendant failed them, validly arrested defendant. See supra, at 7 & 10. Only ten minutes 
elapsed between the search and arrest (R176: 45). See Brown, 334 F.3d at 1167 (cautioning 
appellate courts not to "second guess a street officer's assessment about the order in which 
he should secure potential threats or investigate his suspicions") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Based on these facts, the search was contemporaneous with defendant's arrest for 
driving under the influence, which arrest was supported by probable cause independent of 
the search. See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,226-28 (Utah App. 1995) (holding that pre-
arrest search and seizure of drugs was justified as incident to arrest where probable cause to 
arrest—smell of marijuana coupled with false answers—existed independent of the 
discovered drugs). 
26 
For much the same reason, the discovery of the drugs was also inevitable. See State 
v. James, 2000 UT 80, ffl[ 14-16 (clarifying that pursuant to the "inevitable discovery" 
doctrine, illegally discovered evidence maybe admissible if "'the prosecution can establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have been 
discovered by lawful means,") (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984)). Here, 
this requires a showing that, absent the intervening search, the drugs would still have been 
necessarily and lawfully discovered. See State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985) 
(recognizing that evidence is inevitably discovered when the prosecution shows that "absent 
the illegality," the same evidence would have been discovered "by proper and predictable 
police investigative procedures"), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 141. See also State v. Northrup, 
756 P.2d 1288, 1293-95 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8 (Utah 
App. 1995). Again, the record facts support this. 
As just discussed, Deputy Isaacson made the decision to administer field sobriety tests 
based on the signs of impairment he had observed. Thus, independent of the search, the field 
tests would have been administered. And if administered, defendant would have failed the 
tests. And once failed, probable cause existed for his arrest. Once arrested for driving under 
the influence, the search of his person and discovery of the drugs were inevitable in a search 
incident to arrest. See United States v. Larsen, 111 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing that "[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been 
discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial Fairness can 
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be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been 
in had the impermissible conduct not taken place"), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 1105 (1998). 
* * * 
For these reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's continued 
detention was lawful and the search permissible. This Court should affirm that decision. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE A RULE 702 OBJECTION FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL FROM CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS; 
EVEN IF THE ISSUE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT, IT 
HAS NO MERIT 
For the first time on appeal, defendant challenges Deputy Isaacson's ability to 
recognize the signs of drug impairment. See Br.Aplt. at 15-21. According to defendant, the 
deputy was not "trained or certified" as a drug recognition expert [DRE] and, therefore, not 
qualified to testify that bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, jerky nervousness, facial color 
changes, body tremors, and speeded-up responses were signs of drug impairment. See 
Br.Aplt. at 18. Defendant argues that admission of that testimony violated rule 702, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, the expert witness rule. See Br.Aplt. at 15-21 . See also Add. A. (rule). 
Defendant concedes that he raised no rule 702 objection below. See Br.Aplt. at 15. 
Nor did the conditional plea agreement reserve the right to raise a rule 702 challenge (R. 121 -
22). Nevertheless, defendant presumes that the issue may be considered for the first time on 
appeal because he raises it via ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error. See Br.Aplt. 
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at 15-21. In doing so, defendant fails to recognize the limited nature of his right to appeal 
from his conditional guilty pleas. 
As will be more fully discussed, defendant cannot raise a new issue in an appeal from 
a conditional guilty plea. Instead, he may only raise issues agreed to by the prosecutor and 
approved by the trial court in the conditional plea agreement. 
Alternatively, even if a rule 702 issue was properly before this Court, it has no merit. 
Except for privileges, a trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence in a suppression 
hearing. And even if the rules applied to such proceedings, Deputy Isaacson was a certified 
DRE when he testified at the suppression hearing. Moreover, his lack of certification at the 
time of the stop did not prevent him from testifying to signs of impairment that he was 
trained and experienced in recognizing. Because no error occurred, defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error claims fail. 
A. A Defendant May Not Raise an Issue For the First Time in an Appeal 
From a Conditional Guilty Plea. 
"A voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 
(Utah App. 1988). AccordSpurgeon, 904 P.2d at 223 n.l. A defendant who enters a guilty 
plea does not merely waive consideration of the merits of a pre-plea issue, the plea waives 
the waives his right to even file an appeal. 
Only one exception exists to the guilty plea-waiver rule. If the prosecutor agrees and 
the trial court approves, a defendant may enter a guilty plea conditioned upon his right to 
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appeal a specified adverse pretrial ruling. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i) (Add. A). Accord 
Sery, 758 P.2d at 939; State v. Boboy 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, before 
the merits of an issue may be considered in an appeal from a conditional guilty plea, the 
defendant must "conclusively" establish that (1) he raised an issue in the trial court that was 
decided adversely to him, (2) he reached an agreement with the prosecutor that he could 
reserve the right to appeal the adverse ruling if he pled guilty, and (3) the trial court approved 
the conditional plea agreement reached by the parties. See State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 
305, \ 3 & n.3, 57 P.3d 238; Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1271. Moreover, the terms of a conditional 
plea agreement must be strictly construed. See Norris, 2002 UT App. 305, f 3 & n.3. As 
this Court has commented, an appeal from a conditional guilty plea is "not defendants* 
chance to have their cases tried by the appellate court." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 233 n.l. 
In this case, the parties agreed only that defendant could appeal the "issues that were 
raised at the Suppression Hearing in this matter" (R. 121-22). The only issues raised at that 
hearing were the Fourth Amendment claims discussed in Point I of this brief (R. 34-42; 
R176: 49-66) (Add. B). Defendant concedes that the issues raised in the suppression hearing 
did not include a rule 702-based objection to the deputy's qualifications to testify. See 
Br.Aplt. at 15. Consequently, defendant is prohibited from raising the issue now. 
Claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error does not change this. Rule 
1 l(i) creates a contractual right to appeal where no constitutional or statutory right to appeal 
exists. See cases cited, supra. But ineffective assistance and plain error claims do not effect 
a defendant's right to appeal. They are merely procedural default exceptions, which permit 
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an appellate court to "balance the need for procedural regularity with the demands of 
fairness." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 13, 10 P.3d 346. If these procedural default 
exceptions are applied in appeals from conditional guilty pleas, they would unilaterally 
change the contractual terms of the underlying conditional plea agreement and violate the 
plain mandates of rule 1 l(i). 
In sum, this Court should not create an exception to rule 1 l(i)'s exception. 
B. Alternatively, Defendant Cannot Establish Actual Error and His 
Ineffective Counsel and Plain Error Claims Fail 
Even if a rule 702 challenge was properly raised on appeal, the challenge has no merit. 
Without proof of error, defendant's claims of ineffective assistance and plain error fail.10 
To prevail on appeal, defendant must establish that his trial counsel's failure to raise 
a rule 702 objection was deficient as a matter of law and that the deficiency prejudiced the 
outcome of the suppression hearing. Cf State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162; State 
v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119, 12 P.3d 92 (both setting out test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial). Likewise, to establish plain error, defendant must establish that actual 
error occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error 
10In State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339, ffif 8-10, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, the State 
raised, but the Court did not address, the same argument concerning ineffectiveness and 
plain error claims raised in an appeal from a conditional plea. Instead, the Court 
summarily disposed of the merits of Dunkel's underlying claim: "[E]ven assuming that 
Dunkel may now properly raise this issue through a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel or plain error, his argument is without merit." Id. at *| 8. This approach, while 
easy, encourages circumvention of rule 1 l(i)'s strict dictates. The State addresses the 
merits of defendant's argument only in the interest of complete briefing, but maintains the 
merits should not be considered. 
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prejudiced the outcome of the suppression hearing. Cf State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 
29, \ 16, 94 P.3d 186 (setting out plain error test in context of trial). Here, there was no actual 
error. 
A trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence, including rule 702!s foundational 
requirements, in conducting a suppression hearing and ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence. See State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 
1036 (1988); State v. Clifford, 1999 UT App 112 (unpublished opinion) {Addendum Q . See 
also Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (stating that a court is "not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privileges" in ruling on "[preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness . . . or the admissibility of evidence"); Utah R. Evid. 
1101 (b) (stating that the rules of evidence are inapplicable to "[preliminary questions of fact 
which are to be determined under Rule 104(a)" and to "[miscellaneous proceedings for . . 
. issuance of. . . search warrants") {Add. A). Because the trial court was not bound by rule 
702 in conducting the suppression hearing, it could not have committed plain error for not 
complying with it. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). Nor could trial 
counsel be ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 
| 2 6 , lP.3d546. 
Moreover, even if the evidentiary rules applied to suppression hearings, there was no 
error here. Defendant implicitly concedes that if Deputy Isaacson was trained or certified as 
a DRE, he was qualified to testify as an expert pursuant to rule 702. See Br.Aplt. at 15-17. 
But contrary to defendant's assertions, see Br.Aplt, at 15, defendant was a certified DRE 
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when he testified (R176: 10). He was also trained as a DRE, though not certified, at the time 
of the stop (R176: 10-11) and had experience with drug users (R176: 65). Rule 702 accepts 
professional certification, training, experience, or any combination of these as proper 
qualifications to testify as an expert. See Utah R. Evid. 702 (stating that a witness may 
qualify as an expert based on his "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"). 
Moreover, as the trial court noted, many of the signs of impairment defendant observed did 
not require the specialized knowledge of an expert, but were common knowledge in today's 
drug-infused culture: 
Setting aside the nervousness, setting aside the bloodshot eyes, if you've got 
pupils that look like hoot owls at 11 o'clock in the morning, you've got some 
signals that there may be impairment. 
Officer Isaacson testified he hadn't completed the drug recognition 
certification, but that he's probably made a lot of arrests of impaired drivers, 
and we deal with methamphetamine use in the community, and it isn't hard to 
spot. There are signs and things that are obvious to even people on the street 
that are indicative that somebody is high on meth. 
(R176: 65) (Add. B). See State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, f 34 (recognizing that 
testimony that "an average bystander would be able to providers not expert testimony). 
In sum, defendant's foundational challenge should not be considered for the first time 
on appeal. Even if it is, the failure to raise a rule 702 objection below did not result in either 
ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
This State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, If 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 65 A P.2d 740, 743 
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
Respectfully submitted this oTf day of September, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Christine F. Soltis 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Amendment IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
R U L E 1 1 . PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had 'a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6* 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or 
rejected by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and 
the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, en appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record 
as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this 
rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 
2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005 ] 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by 
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence de-
pends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, 
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all 
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other prelimi-
nary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or 
when an accused is a witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a 
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in 
the case. 
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to 
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
RULE 1101. APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
(a) Courts and Magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings 
in the courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and 
(c). 
(b) Rules Inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do 
not apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 
104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or 
revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses 
and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or 
otherwise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily. 
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissi-
ble as provided under Rule 1102. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1995; April 1, 1999.] 
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Addendum B 
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1 MR. THOMAS: Nothing further. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. BEASLIN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: You go first. 
5 MR. THOMAS: At this point, as the Court is aware, 
6 I've — in my response to Mr. Beaslin's memorandum, I indicated 
7 that I wanted to have this hearing first so we could get the 
8 facts down. There are two ways that we can go about it. I am 
9 prepared to argue it orally, or if the Court would prefer, I can 
10 submit a memorandum. 
11 THE COURT: I will really let you decide that, 
12 Mr. Thomas. If you want to do a memorandum and submit it, I can 
13 rule on it, or you can argue it here today. 
14 MR. THOMAS: Maybe for purposes of efficiency, I'll go 
15 ahead and make the argument today, if that's okay. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, in this particular matter, 
18 Mr. Beaslin has raised a couple issues. The first issue that he 
19 raises is in relation to the search of the pocket, and he uses as 
20 a basis for his — his argument a new case the Court may be 
21 familiar with, and that is the State of Utah vs. LaFonze 
22 (phonetic), which is a Utah Court of Appeals case that is an 
23 I April case, so it's real recent. 
24 I For purposes of argument, the State is willing to 
25 I indicate that that case has factual similarities to this case, 
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1 and I'm willing to accept that for — note I do believe that that 
2 case is actually cert is being sought, so I'm not exactly sure 
3 what the final outcome of that case is, but the State does 
4 acknowledge that it currently is the law in the State of Utah. 
5 With that, let me just refer specific to some aspects of 
6 LaFonze and make the factual distinctions. As the Court well 
7 knows that any time you have a search issue, particularly when 
8 there's a search done or a seizure done outside of a warrant, 
9 it's a factually intensive examination, and the Court has to 
10 carefully examine each fact. The test is in fact the totality of 
11 the circumstances. 
12 When looking at the LaFonze case, and I don't believe 
13 the Court has that in front of you, but if you would note 
14 specifically in paragraph 23 of that case, one of the factual 
15 distinctions that I want to draw in this one is in LaFonze — and 
16 Mr. Beaslin set that forth in his memorandum quite a bit. 
17 In the LaFonze case, this is a situation where they made 
18 a stop -- an officer made a stop, and— 
19 THE COURT: It was a legal stop because the car was 
20 three miles an hour. 
21 MR. THOMAS: That is correct. It was a legal stop. In 
22 addition to that, they had the license plate issue. But 
23 nonetheless, it was a legal stop. As you move through that 
24 analysis, they indicated it was a legal stop, and they also 
25 indicated that based on the conduct of the individual in the 
-51-
1 vehicle moving things around, and specifically stuffing things 
2 between their legs and then other indications, and in fact the 
3 officer had the authority to expand the scope of that stop. I 
4 think factually in this case the Court similarly has the ability 
5 to expand the scope of the stop, and the officer was in fact 
6 justified in asking specific questions based on the totality of 
7 the circumstances and what they observed. 
8 But I want to move beyond that, because as in LaFonze, 
9 we have here where an officer actually was curious about items in 
10 the pocket. The critical aspect in LaFonze is they adopted a 
11 ruling starting with paragraph 24 that just bulging pockets alone 
12 is in the State of Utah no longer sufficient for what has 
13 previously been used as a Terry frisk, and that is for reasonable 
14 cause — or a reasonable suspicion search for weapons. They said 
15 it has to be coupled with something else. 
16 The reason I focus the Court on paragraph 23 is because 
17 in paragraph 23 the Court makes a real distinction that I believe 
18 is factually significant, and that is in paragraph 23 they say 
19 this is not a case where an officer does not know what might be 
20 in the pocket. 
21 In LaFonze, the officer actually observed soft objects 
22 being taken and placed in the pocket. So in LaFonze what they're 
23 basically saying is there was no indication that there was a 
24 violent crime, and there was also no indication of violence 
25 I toward the officer there, but critically, there was no indication 
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1 that there was a harmful hard object or a weapon in the pocket 
2 because the officer observed them take the items that were soft 
3 items and place them in their pocket. Furthermore, they 
4 indicated that that person had given a reasonable explanation for 
5 what it was, that is they were leather workers, and therefore the 
6 leather items that they put in their pocket was consistent with 
7 that. 
8 In this case that's where you draw the factual 
9 distinction. This is a case where the officer had no idea 
10 what was in the pocket. In fact, he did not know and did not 
11 observe the defendant place anything in his pocket at all. 
12 Also factually distinguishable from that is other 
13 characteristics, including the defendant's demeanor, and 
14 specifically the demeanor of some sort of protection over the 
15 right-hand pocket, the officer describes specifically a stiff arm 
16 directly over the pocket while the other arm was loose, 
17 indicating some need to conceal what was in there. 
18 Specifically, this particular defendant, when there were 
19 obvious bulges, the officer asked him if he had anything in his 
20 pocket — not do you have a weapon or anything, but do you have 
21 anything in your pocket, and he — or he — the officer asked 
22 him, "What's in your pocket," and he said, "Nothing." Two times 
23 J he said nothing, when there clearly was something in his pocket. 
24 I So those factual distinctions the Court needs to make 
25 I and make a determination based on the rule of law if in fact 
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1 those distinctions, and the State argues that in fact they do 
2 make a significant difference on what an officer is entitled to 
3 do. 
4 In addition, just as you walk through all of the 
5 indicators, even if you take out the nervousness ones, because 
6 that's one thing that LaFonze talks about, too, is it says you 
7 strike nervousness — general nervousness. I want to talk to you 
8 about that a little bit. First we start with an intense 
9 observation of the officer, even though there's no lights or 
10 sirens going. Through the mirrors while the driver is sitted — 
11 is positioned at an intersection where he's either going to enter 
12 the intersection or cross the intersection. 
13 I That's distinct — that's important, because the focus 
14 is on the rearview mirrors, not on oncoming traffic, until, of 
15 course, the officer notices — or indicates him to pull over with 
16 his hand, no lights or sirens. So clearly you have someone who 
17 is making distinct observation of the officer, an unusual amount 
18 of that. 
19 Then there was nervousness described as the intent on 
20 watching, quick, sharp, jerky eyes and jerky movement, the 
21 bloodshot eyes, and then the wide open eyes and the dilated 
22 pupils were all initial observations that the officer made. 
23 If you take out the quick, sharp, jerky movements and 
24 even the wide open eyes, that still leaves you with the bloodshot 
25 eyes and the dilated pupils. Even if you accept the defendant's 
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explanation that he was welding earlier that day which caused the 
red bloodshot eyes, it does not explain the dilated pupils. 
That's where the State is making the argument that if you have 
dilated pupils at 11 o'clock in the morning coupled with these 
other things that could be indicative of one or the other, you 
have to make a reasonable inference of where that is going. I 
think the Court can then take that inference and say there 
may have been a portion of nervousness, but it can be added to 
the totality of the circumstances based on the training and 
experience of the officer knowing that in fact that is also 
indicative of methamphetamine use or a stimulant use — bloodshot 
eyes, dilated pupils and the nervousness, and specifically the 
quick, sharp and jerky movements. 
You then move on with additional information. He steps 
from the vehicle. At that point you have body tremors and still 
the quick movements, consistent not only with methamphetamine use 
or — it's consistent with methamphetamine use and particularly 
the body tremors is with that. 
The color draining from his face also consistent with 
the use of drugs or narcotics, and the internal clock mechanism 
was also off so much so that during the Romburg test the officer 
indicated that he estimated 30 seconds in 10 seconds, which 
indicates the very rapid Romburg or internal clock, which would 
be consistent with his quick movements. 
THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, held me validate my recollection 
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1 on that. Was the — was he told to empty his pockets after the 
2 field sobriety tests or before? 
3 MR. THOMAS: Before. 
4 THE COURT: Before. 
5 MR. THOMAS: It was before. But — and the Romburg test 
6 was actually not brought before the Court's attention until the 
7 defendant testified that there were other things that occurred. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. THOMAS: I think the Romburg was — the reason the 
10 State is concerned about that is because if in fact his internal 
11 clock was messed up, that's also consistent with whether or not 
12 his memory is accurate versus the officer's. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. THOMAS: If you put all those together, what the 
15 State's arguments and what I believe is you can add those in the 
16 totality of the circumstances, even though some of it could be 
17 attributed to nervousness, but it's also very consistent with 
18 stimulant use. That's where the officer went. 
19 I think that it's admirable that this particular officer 
20 1 as he continued to make conduct — and this is where there's some 
21 additional evidence I think the Court needs to really carefully 
22 make a distinction between the LaFonze case, and that is the 
23 officer asked — after all these indicators, the officer is 
24 focusing his investigations to whether or not there's substance 
25 abuse, then he asked about the pockets and twice after the 
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1 defendant saying, "There's nothing in my pockets," the officer 
2 then takes the next step. He doesn't just say, "Clearly there's 
3 something in there." He doesn't just reach in, even though he's 
4 got a level of suspicion, which is a very high level of suspicion 
5 based on his training and experience. 
6 At that point he then notifies the defendant of his 
7 Miranda rights. In other words, the officer takes an additional 
8 step of saying, you know, "Look—" well, actually he had emptied 
9 some things from his pockets at that point, but he still refused 
10 to empty something. 
11 J At that point he knew that — he was really concerned 
12 that he was hiding something specific, and the officer didn't say 
13 he thought it was weapons, but he took the correct step. He 
14 didn't say, "Well, hey, it still might be a weapon so I'm going 
15 for it," or anything like that. He identified, "You know what, I 
16 know there's something being hidden there. I've got all these 
17 indicators of stimulant use, and you've still got something in 
18 your pocket," and so he notified him of his rights. 
19 I think that's significant, a significant deviation 
20 from the facts you have in LaFonze. I think that in and of 
21 itself goes to support what the officer did. After that consent 
22 J he said, "What have you got in your pockets now?" That's when — 
23 I or pull that out, and that's when in fact he responded by his 
24 actions by removing that. 
25 I So the State would argue that we have met our standard 
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1 and the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances, and the 
2 totality of the circumstances, and that it's factually 
3 distinguishable from LaFonze. 
4 MR. BEASLIN: May I please the Court with reference to 
5 Mr. Thomas, what we're really talking about here, your Honor, is 
6 the totality of the circumstances under which the circumstances 
7 arise due to the fact that he, Officer Isaacson, merely stopped 
8 Mr. Hogue with absolutely no criminal act being participated in. 
9 The truck was legal, he was legal. He had not committed any act 
10 of crime whatsoever. He stopped and he asked him, and the 
11 purpose was to talk about David Sentie, and he did that, and he 
12 told him where he had been. 
13 At that point in time there was no articutable suspicion 
14 given at that time for him to go any further or do anything. He 
15 should have quit then. Under Lopez, of course, it says that the 
16 stop should be reasonable, and after the purpose of the stop has 
17 been performed, then he ought to just release him. That's what I 
18 asked him, "Why didn't you just release him then?'' Now he comes 
19 up with all these great things, he said he observed this, he did 
20 that and so forth. 
21 As indicated in LaFonze, I think it's simple. It says 
22 here the question of nervousness, that — LaFonze — they have 
23 now rewritten that and published it now in 470, Utah (inaudible) 
24 page 763. It says, "We have previously held that because nervous 
25 behavior such as avoidance of eye contact is consistent with 
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1 innocence as well as criminal behavior. Such contact can be 
2 afforded no weight in determining — determining or detaining 
3 officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 
4 I think that's what we have here. The mere fact that 
5 the eyes contact and so forth, that that doesn't necessarily mean 
6 that Mr. Hogue had committed any crime or was about to commit a 
7 crime or was any threat to Mr. Isaacson, your Honor. 
8 Also with reference to the nervousness, the case further 
9 goes on, "Absent LaFonze's nervous and evasive behavior, the 
10 State's justification derived from Officer Salice's testimony 
11 essentially boils down to these: LaFonze removed two small 
12 purses from the vehicle, her pockets were bulging and she wore 
13 baggy layered clothing. We conclude that these circumstances 
14 taken together do not — do not constitute specific and 
15 articutable facts such that a reasonable prudent man would be 
16 warranted in belief that his safety or that of others was in 
17 danger." 
18 Of course, the Terry case of course with reference to 
19 the frisk is the same thing. He testified that he did in fact 
20 make a frisk — a Terry frisk on him. In that same case, your 
21 Honor, they cite People vs. Liscomb, which is a New York Case, 
22 579 NY2.d. "Even assuming officers were entitled to conduct a 
23 protective frisk, they were not entitled to require defendant to 
24 empty his pockets." I think that the Courts have held and other 
25 cases have held that the pockets — they do not — are not 
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1 entitled to have them reduced or to take out the things in their 
2 pockets. That's what he did with him was to have him remove what 
3 he had in his pocket when in fact no crime had been committed. 
4 He didn't have a weapon. He hadn't done anything at that point 
5 in time. I think the facts are that he should have stopped as 
6 soon as he made the initial question about Sentie. Once he's 
7 talking about Sentie that's why he was there. He wasn't there 
8 for any other reason, other to find out what happened to David so 
9 that he could maybe take care of the burglary case that he had 
10 been looking into that morning — 11 o'clock in the morning, and 
11 then he comes up with these other things, your Honor. 
12 The issue is really whether or not where do we stop it, 
13 and I think under the Lopez that we stop it right there. As 
14 indicated in LaFonze, of course, the young lady — asked her to 
15 remove the purse she put in the front pocket. He placed the 
16 purse — she — he placed the hood — the purse on the hood of 
17 the car. He then instructed defendant to remove the other bag 
18 from the right pocket. The defendant's demeanor was not hostile 
19 or threatening, and I think that we have the same fact situation 
20 here. Mr. Hogue's attitude was not hostile or threatening to 
21 Deputy Isaacson, as I've indicated in the memorandum that I Ve 
22 got there — that I gave to you, your Honor, and he was then 
23 arrested and so forth. 
24 The Court held, "The investigating Officer Salice had no 
25 reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk and the resulting 
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1 search of her person." That's what they reversed it on, if you 
2 recall, in that case, your Honor. 
3 I think we've got the same similar statutory— 
4 THE COURT: In that case, Mr. Beaslin — is it the 
5 LaFonze case? 
6 MR. BEASLIN: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: I understand from your facts, and I haven't 
8 read the case. The stop was made because of a speeding and a 
9 license plate light. 
10 MR. BEASLIN: Right. 
11 THE COURT: Their focus at the — on this appeal wasn't 
12 regarding the driver, but a passenger. 
13 MR. BEASLIN: That's right. 
14 THE COURT: So was there any suspicion of any drug 
15 use recognition or any alcohol or anything like that? Why were 
16 they — why did they search her pockets? 
17 MR. BEASLIN: Well, they didn't need to, and that's what 
18 the Court said. 
19 THE COURT: There's no basis to. 
20 MR. BEASLIN: I know, and there's no basis here for 
21 searching Mr. Hogue. He hadn't done anything at the time when he 
22 pulled up off the highway. He stopped, told him that he had 
23 given David a ride that day and that was it. I don't know that 
24 he had to do anything more. 
25 It was Officer Isaacson then continued to, and the 
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1 second point that I made in my memorandum was the questioning of 
2 the defendant has no basis for further questioning. Deputy 
3 Isaacson had no basis for asking extraneous questions, including 
4 questions about knives and weapons. 
5 The law is well settled that once the stop is made the 
6 detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 
7 effectuate the purpose of the stop, State vs. Lopez. As you 
8 know, Lopez is kind of the guiding light with reference to for 
9 search and seizure. I think that that's what he did wrong — I 
10 think that he kept going and asking him questions about it when 
11 there was no reason to. 
12 In LaFonze, of course, the passenger, as indicated the 
13 case — or as I just read a minute ago, that the fact that the 
14 bulging pockets and so forth was really no indication, and they 
15 gave — the Court gave no indication that that was the case. The 
16 bulging pockets they say — they likely should not be reviewed as 
17 any more suspicious than the bags themselves that they put into 
18 that, and all of those items, your Honor, are listed in the 
19 LaFonze case. 
2 0 Their conclusion was that given the inherent nature of 
21 the crimes being investigated and that the absence of reasonable 
22 suspicion suggesting the presence of weapons, that something — 
23 there was no occasion to frisk LaFonze, and there wasn't any 
24 reason for frisking Mr. Hogue here, either. Therefore, they've 
25 held that the suppression — and they reversed Judge Anderson 
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1 down in the Seventh Circuit, your Honor — Seventh District. 
2 In any event, our position is that there is no basis or 
3 no reason at all for Mr. — Officer Isaacson to go further than 
4 what he did. I think he went too far. I think he went too far, 
5 and I think that you should suppress the evidence that they have, 
6 your Honor, in reference to what they found after they went into 
7 the pockets and so forth of — the bulge of the pockets as 
8 indicated in LaFonze. 
9 LaFonze, now, your Honor, is — the new one is in 470 
10 Utah Advanced Reports 863, as I indicated. I think that case is 
11 clearly on and in line with our fact situation we have here, your 
12 Honor. The rule is, I think, that Officer Isaacson just went too 
13 far and he should have let him go after the initial stop and 
14 after he did what he had to do at that point. Thanks. 
15 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Thomas? 
16 MR. THOMAS: Just real briefly. I'd just like to 
17 reiterate there are similarities between LaFonze, a factual basis 
18 and this particular case, but I do believe that there are factual 
19 distinctions. 
20 The two key ones that I think are really important, I — 
21 I I believe that the State has met its burden when it comes to the 
22 I expansion of the stop, and that is because the officer had a lot 
23 of reasonable suspicion that he may have an impaired driver, 
24 somebody on the road. I think he's justified in going further. 
25 I Moving directly to the search or the request to remove 
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1 items from the pocket, in LaFonze they also had some general 
2 nervousness. They had some other indicators that are similar to 
3 this one. 
4 In this one we have some other factual distinctions as 
5 well, but two key ones that I think are really important for the 
6 Court to focus on, the one in LaFonze the officer did observe 
7 items going into the pocket. He observed the passenger of the 
8 vehicle pick up some items, place them between her legs, take 
9 them out of the car with her and place them in her pocket, and 
10 those were soft items. 
11 The officer was saying at that point he thought that she 
12 may have a weapon in her pocket because there was a bulging 
13 pocket. 
14 In paragraph 23 the Court says, "This is not a situation 
15 where the officer did not know what was in their pocket." So I 
16 think that's factually distinguishable. Clearly in this case you 
17 had an officer who did not know what was in their pockets. 
18 That gets you to the inquiry. That gets you to the 
19 inquiry of what's in your pockets or do you have anything in your 
20 pocket, and the defendant then lied. In addition, you've got a 
21 very distinct physical characteristic of the defendant attempting 
22 to protect by that stiff arm over the right pocket. There 
23 clearly was a physical characteristic that's distinguishable from 
24 what was going on in LaFonze. Very distinguishable there. 
25 I Finally, in this particular case the officer after 
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1 narrowing down his search, when he felt like he needed to do 
2 more, and after he finally getting whatever was in that pocket, 
3 he gave a Miranda warning. So he specifically, before he went 
4 on, notified the defendant of specific rights under the 
5 Constitution not to respond to his questioning. The defendant 
6 consented to the questioning and responded by removing the items 
7 from his pocket. I think those are distinguishable from LaFonze. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me make some observations. 
9 I think that these suppression hearings, these search and seizure 
10 cases are very interesting. I've been on the bench long enough 
11 I to hear many of these cases. I can just say that applying the 
12 standards and the guidelines that we're given from the higher 
13 courts, it boils down to whether under a totality of the facts — 
14 all of the facts and circumstances the activities and the actions 
15 of law enforcement folks are reasonable given the Constitutional 
16 guidelines that we have. 
17 I agree with Mr. Beaslin that State vs. Lopez says that 
18 you make a stop, do what you have to do to initiate or conclude 
19 the purpose of the stop, and at that point the defendant should 
20 be free to go. I don't think — again, in this case, I think 
21 J Mr. Thomas has by the officer's testimony gotten us past that. 
22 I I think the question I had was well, this was just a 
23 stop, just a questioning. Deputy Isaacson motioned him to pull 
24 over. They were going to stop and talk about Isaacson's question 
25 I regarding Mr. Sentie. I suppose based on him pointing his finger 
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1 to pull over at that point, you know, you could argue he was 
2 detained. Probably — I don't know, it's interesting to note 
3 what would have happened if he hadn't. But anyway, he did. They 
4 discussed Sentie. Then from the evidence that was educed here, 
5 Officer Isaacson was pretty clear in recognizing some signals. 
6 Having recognized those signals he figured he had an 
7 impaired driver, and I think he was justified in continuing the 
8 purpose for a stop on that basis. 
9 Setting aside the nervousness, setting aside the 
10 bloodshot eyes, if you've got pupils that look like hoot owls at 
11 11 o'clock in the morning, you've got some signals that there may 
12 be some impairment. 
13 Officer Isaacson testified he hadn't completed the drug 
14 recognition certification, but that he's probably made a lot of 
15 arrests for impaired drivers, and we deal with methamphetamine 
16 use in the community, and it isn't hard to spot. There are some 
17 signs and things that are obvious to even people on the street 
18 that are indicative that somebody is high on meth. 
19 There -- Deputy Isaacson testified as to the basis for 
2 0 his suspicions, his reasonable suspicions, and he wanted to go 
21 further. Then, as Mr. Thomas said, we get to the search. The 
22 search, I guess as a result of Deputy Isaacson asking him what 
23 was in his pockets, there was visibly something in his pocket. 
24 He said it extended in a bulge and that he was concerned. The 
2 5 defendant answered nothing twice when asked if there was — what 
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1 I was in his pockets. They gave him Miranda. He was asked to 
2 empty his pockets, and out came the dope. 
3 I think his actions are reasonable here, Mr. Beaslin. 
4 Ifm going to deny your motion to suppress. The thing that 
5 complicated this case, and the thing that made it interesting is 
6 why — that there was really no reason for the stop in the first 
7 place. It was a voluntary stop. I guess once having received 
8 those signals as to impairment, he was justified in continuing it 
9 further, and that's what he did. 
10 I suppose on this basis we ought to just set both of 
11 these cases again for status, or if you want a trial date we can 
12 give you a trial date. 
13 MR. BEASLIN: We'll set it for status, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Two weeks? 
15 COURT CLERK: April 30th. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
17 (Hearing concluded) 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
BENCH. 
*1 Inventory searches are a well recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. See State v. Hygh, 111 P.2d 264, 
267-68 (Utah 1985) (citing South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976)). " 
In order to support a finding that a valid inventory 
search has taken place, the court must first 
determine whether there was reasonable and proper 
justification for the impoundment of the vehicle." Id. 
at 268. The State must also show " 'that there 
exists an established reasonable procedure for 
safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents 
and that the challenged police activity was 
essentially in conformance with that procedure.' " 
Id. at 269 (quoting 2 Wayne H. LaFave, Search & 
Seizure § 7.4 at 576-77 (1978)). 
Defendant concedes that his vehicle was justifiably 
impounded. He argues, however, that the trial court 
erred in finding the inventory search valid because 
the State failed to meet its burden to establish that a 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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standardized procedure for inventory searches 
existed and that the officer complied with the 
procedure when conducting the search of 
defendant's vehicle. Specifically, defendant argues 
that the best evidence rule, Rule 1002 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, requires the State to introduce 
the actual written policy at the suppression hearing. 
We disagree. The best evidence rule does not apply 
because the determination as to the admissibility of 
the gun was not made at trial, but rather was made 
at a pretrial suppression hearing, where the rules of 
evidence do not apply. See Utah R.Evid. 1101(b)(1) 
and Utah R.Evid. 104(a). FN1 
FN1. A defendant who wishes to make an 
evidentiary challenge, such as a best 
evidence objection under Rule 1002, must 
proceed to trial and make the evidentiary 
challenge there. 
Even if the best evidence rule did apply, the State is 
not bound to "submit written procedures in order to 
carry its burden of showing that its agents acted in 
accordance with standardized procedures when 
performing an inventory search of an impounded 
automobile." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 989 
(Utah Ct.App.1992). In Strickling, as in the instant 
case, evidence regarding the procedures for 
inventory searches came solely from the testimony 
of the searching officer at a pretrial suppression 
hearing. Id at 988. The testimony of the officer in 
the instant case, like the testimony of the officer in 
Strickling, was sufficient to establish the existence 
of, and compliance with, standardized procedures. 
Additionally, defendant's contention that the 
inventory search was invalid because the officer 
failed to complete it himself is without merit. The 
fact that the first officer did not complete the search 
himself is unimportant because the record reflects 
that a second officer completed it. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 
finding the inventory search valid because it was 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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conducted as a pretext to an investigative motive. 
We again disagree. The law allows an officer to 
impound a vehicle "with registration that has been 
expired for more than three months." Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-1101(l)(f)(i) (1998). The officer in 
this case testified that he routinely impounds when a 
vehicle is well past the required time for 
registration, as defendant's vehicle was in this case. 
In Strickling, the court determined that the State 
produced the necessary threshold evidence when the 
impounding officer testified that he impounds sixty 
to seventy-five percent of the vehicles he stops for 
expired plate registrations. See Strickling, 844 P.2d 
at 987. The court then stated that "[t]he 
determinative evidence here is what the officer 
actually did, without regard to his motives in a 
particular case, when confronted with registration 
violations." Id. The uncontroverted testimony of the 
officer in the instant case is that he impounds 
ninety-nine percent of the vehicles he stops when 
plate registration expired nine months earlier. 
Moreover, in addition to the long expired 
registration, defendant could not provide proof of 
insurance, further demonstrating that impoundment 
was proper. Upon properly impounding the vehicle, 
an inventory search was required. 
*2 The long expired registration and the defendant's 
inability to provide proof of insurance, coupled with 
the officer's stated impoundment practices, 
demonstrate that the officer properly conducted the 
inventory search in accordance with established 
policy and procedure. Therefore, even assuming the 
continued viability of the pretext doctrine in 
inventory search cases, there was no pretext in this 
FN2 
case. z 
evidence and defendant's resulting conviction. 
GREENWOOD, A.P J., and DAVIS, J., concur. 
Utah App., 1999. 
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FN2. Compare State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 
268 (stating the inventory exception does 
not apply when the inventory is merely a 
pretext) with State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1138 (Utah 1994) (rejecting the 
pretext doctrine in traffic stops). 
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's 
determination that the inventory search of 
defendant's vehicle was valid. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's refusal to suppress the 
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